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In the late 1970s prominent figures in the South African state made
a number of spectacular statements of reform- In 1978 PW Botha
warned South Africans to "adapt or die." The following year, Piet
Koornhof declared war on the dompas and announced that apartheid was
dead. Around the same time, the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions
recommended substantial revision of South Africa's racial
legislation. By the end of the decade, reform had been placed
firmly on the South African agenda.
The dramatic appearance of reform in this per iod has been subjected
to much academic scrutiny <1). The nature of reform has been
analysed and attempts have been made to explain it, but little
historical work has been done on the origins of reform. This was
partly a result of political choice. Much of the literature was
produced to expose reform. Thus its focus tended to be on the
present and future, more than on the past (2). There are other
causes for the ahistorical nature of the 1iterature. One is that
the public appearance of reform was sudden, and that it followed
hard on the heels of the 1976-77 uprising and the Mulder gate? power
struggle within the National Party. Another relates to the issue of
sources. Post-1958 official documents sire not readily available to
academics. Contemporary research must lean heavily on published
government documents and on newspaper reports. Nei ther of these
lend themselves to an analysis of historical processes wi thin the
state (3).
As a result, the 1iterature on reform is disproportionately weighted
towards the period after the Soweto uprising. Several writers
acknowledge that reform has roots that go deeper into the past than
1976, but few explore these roots in any detail (4). All we are
left with is a few references to the end of the 1960s boom and to
the Durban strikes of 1973. What effects, if any, this had on the
South Afr ican state prior to the late seventies remain unexplored.
Reforms pr ior to this per iod sire not discussed, even when they are
as obvious as the reintroduction of 30-year * home-ownership' in
1975. The paper that follows does not purport to fill this gap in
the 1i terature. It does, however, raise the question of reform
pr ior to 1976 and it addresses one facet of it. Name 1y, the
reformist career of Punt Janson as Deputy Minister of Bantu
Administration and Education from November 1972 to January 1976.
The paper departs from early revisionist work in that it does not
see the South African state as the uncomplicated tool of capital.
Nor does i t accept the 1iberal view that the apartheid state is a
juggernaut over which capital has no control whatsoever. Rather, it
regards the state and capital as separate forces, but forces between
which there is a tense accommodation (5). As Blaser notes, the
state has to compromise with capital for various reasons: state
actors need corporate taxes for their political projects and for
their personal incomes; they depend on a wel1 functioning economy
for the legitimacy on which their position is based; as sel f
def ined guardians of the * national interest' they have to prevent a
descent into chaos (6). But this also means that the state must
also, on occasion, compromise with the dominated classes. If order
is to be maintained, the state has sometimes to abandon political
projects in the face of resistance from below. This resistance need
not take the form of overt rebellion. To take an example from the
paper: after the Afr ican population had ignored influx control for
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over a decade, the state was -forced to modi fy its grand apartheid
plans. The paper also rejects a view of the state as monolithic.
There are significant tensions within the state, tensions inside and
between different departments and different branches of the state.
These tensions ar& affected by, but not reducible to, class forces.
Wi thin the context of these tensions, there is some space for
individual actors to have an effect on policy. This space is
severely 1imited, but as I hope to show below, it does exist.
The paper starts by sketching the context to Punt Janson's years
career in the Department of Bantu Administration and Education. It
draws attention to various pressures acting on apartheid in the
ear ly 1970s and to tensions wi thin the ranks of Afr i kaner
national ism. I then detai1 some of Janson's personal history and
argue that this history predisposed him towards reformist responses
to the pressures on apartheid. I look at the reforms that he
initiated and at the conf1ict between him and a verkrampte faction
within the Department of Bantu Administration. I show that the
verkrampte faction was able to obstruct Janson's activities, and
ultimately to have him removed from the department. Nevertheless, I
conclude that Janson's three years in the department are a
significant episode in the origins of reform. I argue that his
reformist project received strong support from the administration
boards and that his presence fac i1i tated major reforms in township
administration. I i1lustrate this argument with a case study of the
Vaal Triangle Administration Board.
II
In the early 1970's the great South African economic boom of the
1960s finally ran out of steam. In the 1971/72 financial year, the
growth rate dropped from 77. to 5X.; the f ol lowing year it was down to
37.. At the same t i me, the consumer price index star ted to r i se. By
mid-1973 it had reached a post war high of 7.47.. With the fuel
price increases of the following year i t soared into double figures
(7) .
Representatives of manufacturing capital diagnosed the root of the
problem as being economic apartheid. Investment during the boom had
tended to be capital intensive. White population growth proved
unable to meet the demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour that
this investment produced. By 1971 skilled labour shortages
approached 100 000 jobs (8). At the same time, there was
widespread black unemployment. Manufacturing capi tal and i ts
supporters in the Un i ted Party and the Eng1ish Press argued that
the economy had expanded as far as it could without making use of
skilled black labour (9), They also identified the Physical
Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act as a major economic
obstruction. They blamed the Planning Act for creating artificial
shortages of black labour in addi tion to a generalised uncertainty
about the? future of investment in the metropolitan areas (10).
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As the chorus of criticism grew louder, the state responded. The
Geyser Committee on Manpower in 1971 recommended greater training of
black workers (11). The Riekert White Paper on Industrial
Decentralisation, which incorporated the Geyser Committee proposals,
called for some exemptions from the restr ictions of the Planning
Act. It also recommended the removal of job reservation in the
border areas (12). The following year the state amended regulations
governing the labour structure of the South African Railways and
Harbours so as to provide for the more efficient use of black
labour C13). In the 1972 Budget Speech, Nico Diederichs adopted
an accommodating stance concerning the Planning Act and the training
of black workers: "I wish to emphasise that the Government is
always prepared to consider adjustments of labour policy within the
basic framework of our society, in order to promote efficiency and
productivity." He stressed that the state allowed exemptions from
the Plann ing Act and from job reservation, and he noted that the
Industr ia1 Cone i1iation Act had been amended to provide for the
subsidisation of in-service training (14).
Diederichs's speech had hinted that the state was willing to
reconsider economic policy. Later in 1972, the Reynders Commission
on the Export Trade was more explicit. The Commission noted that
there were "restrictions of all kinds on the optimum use of the
total labour force of the country. This situation makes for
decreased overa11 labour productivity and increased wages in some
labour categories, resulting in higher costs which weaken the
competititive ability in the domestic and foreign markets" (15).
It recommended that these restrictions be removed:
The realisation of a satisfactory rate of general economic and
export growth demands a better and fuller uti1isation of aJi
the manpower resources of the country, and calIs for some
relaxation of the 1 imitations on Bantu labour not only in the
Homelands and Border Areas, but also on a selected basis
elsewhere in South Africa, particularly where the export
performance is at stake...
It serves no purpose to open up job opportuni ties for
Non-Whi tes i f persons qualified to fill them are not
available. Perhaps the most important single factor
contributing to increased productivity is adequate training.
The Commission accepts that, particularly in so far as the
Bantu is concerned, there ar& some important deficiencies in
the training (especially technical training) of a properly
quali fied labour force and that this requires urgent attention
(16) .
The second recommendation was accepted by Diederichs in his 1973
budget speech. He declared that "the increase in productivity of
bantu employees is today of the greatest importance," and that an
inter-departmental committee had been established to draw up
guitielines for training African workers throughout the country
(17). The? next day the Rancf OaiJy flail gleefully reported his
speech under the head 1ine, "The capi tulation of economic
apartheid" (IS).
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This *capitulation' had ramifications- If African workers were
going to be trained to take up skilled jobs in the metropolitan
areas, their claim to a permanent place in these "white" areas grew
stronger. HJ van Zi j1, the Secretary of Bantu Education
acknowledged this in a radio interview: "Opgeleide Bantoewerkers
sal tydelik permanent (sic) in blanke gebiede bly en die Regering
het nie daarteen beswaar nie" (19). By 1973, however, the state
had little option but to accept the 'temporary permanence' of urban
Africans, Influx control and forced removals notwithstanding, the
movement of people from the homelands to the metropolitan areas had
not been reversed. The state's own figures attested to this. JF
Otto, the chief director of Planning estimated that by the end of
the? century, 757. of all Africans would be living in the urban areas
(20). Faced with such predictions, even Eiselen, Secretary of
Native Affairs under Verwoerd, conceded that the bantustans could
never support the entire black population of South Africa (21). MC
Botha, the Minister of Bantu Affairs, reluctantly concurred (22).
Other prominent Nationalists went even further. Prof Nie Rhoodie
told the press that "the African in the White areas was a bona fide
urban dweller who preferred the Western 1i fe style and had no wish
to be nationalised... South Africa would be forced by circumstances
to recognise the urban African as a new historical category and as a
separate socio-political group" (23). Piet Koornhof, then Deputy
Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, announced that
workers with Section 10 qualifications would have their right to
family life protected in the urban areas, although he withdrew this
announcement after a verkrampte uproar (24),
III
The Nationalists' commi tment to grand apartheid had begun to look
wobbly for the first time in a decade. In response, 1iberal
capitalists emerged from the shadows of the sixties boom to mobi1ise
energetically for reforms. The degree to which this mobi1isation
was co-ordinated is unclear. Never the1 ess, over the course of 1972
and 1973, a clear business reform package was discernible from the
public announcements of prominent capitalists. Dr FP Jacobs of USCO
set out the basic premise of this package at a meeting of the
Afrikaanse Sakekamer: "Our approach should be one in which we
accept that our economic growth is inseparably bound up wi th them
and that we must therefore create the necessary procedures to
satisfy their aspirations, desires and needs in order to promote
efficiency and productivity" (25). The rest of the reformist
package is now fami 1iar. In addition to the successful mobi1isat ion
around training (26), there were calls for an end to petty apartheid
(27) and for support for black entrepeneurs <28). In addition,
there was the predictable obsession with black homeownership,
spearheaded by the building societies. Roy Canning of the Natal
Building Society decided that the time had come "to allow private
enterprise to invest in African township development and enable the
more successful to own their own homes." Lucas Bull, General
Manager of the United Building Society and amateur academic, noted
that "history has shown that home-ownership is one of the strongest
factors in stopping com/nun ism" (29) .
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The United Party adopted the reformist calls of capital
wholeheartedly. Their leader, Sir De Villiers Graaf, made urban
African policy the centre of his attack on the government in the
1972 no-confidence debate (30). In Johannesburg, the United Party
control led City Counci1 pressed for home-ownership rights for
Sowetans. JF Oberholtzer, the United Party Chairman of the
Management Committee, approached the Department of Bantu Affairs
wi th echoes of Lucas Bui 1: "We believe home ownership is the best
way to combat communism, for i t g ives a man new hope and a stake in
his country" (31).
By the early 1970s, however, the UP was in the process of
disintegration, and the National Party could afford to ignore it.
But these years did not treat all South African political actors as
harshly as they did the United Party. For bantustan leaders, the
early seventies were a period of unprecedented influence. It was in
this period that the Nationalists started seriously to float their
bantustan policy. In 1972 and 1973 there were close to 150 meetings
between bantustan leaders and National Party ministers (32). At
these meetings, the Nationalists tried to win the support, or at
least the co-operation of bantustan leaders. This they were able to
do, but at some cost. The bantustan leaders were aware that
co-operation would put them in the role of Vorster's puppets. So
they tried to establish their anti-Nationalist credentials by being
outspoken in their rejection of apartheid. Gatsha Buthelesi
distinguished himself in this respect and rose to national
prominence. Richard Turner argued in 1973 that "it is people like
Chief Butheleai who aris recognised by the bulk of Africans as their
present leaders" (33). Other bantustan leaders were not content to
wait in Buthelezi's shadow. They too maintained that they were
work ing for change from inside'the system and they tr ied to extract
concessions from Vorster that would support this claim. Vorster,
for his part, realised that 'leaders' with credibility would be a
greater asset than 'leaders' without credibility. He therefore
tolerated an unprecedented degree of public criticism from the
bantustan leaders and he even granted some of their more moderate
demands (34).
While all this was taking place inside the country, overseas, the
sports boycott and the disinvestment movement were gathering
strength (35). Apartheid seemed to be under pressure for the first
time in a decade, and some of its supporters started to waver. An
NGK representative called for the end of migrant labour on the
grounds that the "splitting of families for labour purposes was
cruel and could never be justified on Christian principles" (36).
The Institute of Administrators of Non-European Affairs (IANA)
bemoaned the lack of shopping fac i1i ties in the urban African
townships; i ts president called for home-ownership in the % whi te'
areas (37); and i ts 1973 annual conference learnt about humanism
and the urban African:
the first thing he asks of us is this recognition and
acceptance of his d igni ty as a man, as a human being, and
unless it is granted to him as his divine right, the racial
harmony which this country must have if it is to survive will
elude us (38) .
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The South African Foundation recognised the need "to eradicate
personal indigni ties that have been inherent in legislation and
custom -for so long, " and it regretted that "the Black el i te —
professional people, academics, teachers, businessmen and women -
had virtually no opportunities to expand their horizons" (39)- The
Nationalist press gave space -for disgruntled Afrikaner academics to
call for reforms in Bantu Affairs policy (40). Afrikaner capital
a1 so c1 ambered onto the reform bandwagon. SANLAM proud 1y announced
in September 1972 that it had done away with all apartheid within
its organisation (41). The president of the AHI, CFJ Human called
for a more enlightened labour policy (42). The Afrikaner Sakekamer
were told to accept the permanency of urban Africans and to improve
conditions in the townships and on the factory floor (43). The ASK
and the AHI both called vociferously for the training of African
workers (44).
In this context, reformist elements started to show themselves
within the National Party. Theo Gerdener, while Minister of the
Interior and leader of the Natal Nationalists, warned that long term
peace in South Africa would be impossible unless the government
closed the wage gap (45). Soon after issuing this warning, Berdener
left the? Nationalist Party to form his ill-fated Democratic Party.
Other reformists remained in the party- One of these was Piet
Koornhof, who developed his ver1igte reputation as Deputy Minister
of Bantu Administration and Education, before his promotion to
Minister of Sport in August 1972. Koornhof's verligte achievements
in the department of Bantu Affairs were not impressive: he arranged
that black professionals would be exempt from influx control and he
forced his verkrampte Minister of Bantu Affairs, MC Botha, to
acknowledge the permanency of urban Africans. As would later become
his hallmark, he tended to promise a great deal more than he
actually delivered (46). Nevertheless, Koornhof established a
i/erJ igte base within the Department of Bantu Affairs. Punt Janson,
his successor in the department, buiIt on this base wi th spectacular-
effects.
IV
Janson was born into a Dutch speaking home in Dullstroom in 1917.
His parents were strict Calvinists, but they were less racist than
many of their contemporar ies- Janson recalIs being beaten by his
father for being rude to a black person older than him. During the
Great Depression his family fell on hard times and Janson remembered
that in this period he grew to hate "the Englishman, not because he
was English, but because he was rich." The Janson family split up
as his father sought work as a migrant in the Transvaal forestry
department. He himself was sent away to an NGK school in
Lydenburg. After finishing high shool, Janson managed to put
himself through a degree in Theology at the University of Pretoria
by mconlighting as an estate agent and a travel 1 ing salesman. He
then moved to Witbank where he worked as an NGK minister. He turned
down a request to stand for the National Party in Witbank in the
1948 general election, but in 1952 he was elected to the Witbank
Town Counci1, where he gained some experience in African township
Janson and Reform Page 7
administration. He -f inal ly entered par 1 i amen tar y pol i tics as the
Nationalist MP -for Witbank in 1957, In August 1972, Janson emerged
•from relative obscuri ty to become Deputy Minister o-f Bantu
Administration and Education <47) .
Janson brought elements o-f his Calvinist past with him into the
Bantu Af-fairs Department. The most striking of these were his
unprecedented frankness and his paternalistic humanism. Unlike any
of his predecessors, ha not only recognised the failures of grand
apartheid, but also was prepared to announce them in pub lie. His
first major speech as deputy minister contained some extraordinary
admi ssions:
Bantu will for many years, in our generation, in the time of
generations yet to come, be in the White areas...
I want to state quite frankly that there is a housing shortage
for Bantu...
These aid centres were established years ago. I agree that
they were not functioning properly and I want to state
emphatically that even at the moment they &re not
functioning properly at all (48).
This type of honesty remained a feature of Janson's deputy
ministership. From 1973 to 1975 the English language press followed
him around as he made repeated public statements acknowledging that
urban Africans were a South African reality and that traditional
National Party policy towards them had been woefully inadequate
(49) .
Janson's human i sm was no 1ess str i k i ng than his frankness.
stressed
point of receiving the same
he insisted that "Relations
a.re fostered by an attitude of the heart and
He
Janson, the attitude of heart and mind which
treatment as whi tes (50). In par 1iament
are not fostered by legislation; they
mind." (51). For
fostered good racfS
he tried to set an example
In a press release, he
come to my office and I
with you. Your requests
give." (52). This offer
his three years of office,
relations was one of approachabi1ity, and
for the rest of his department to follow.
invited Africans: "If you have problems,
will try to find the time to discuss them
will be given all the consideration I can
was not completely without substance. In
Janson showed a remarkable energy for visiting townships, receiving
delegations and soliciting advice. He met with or received
memoranda from bantustan leaders, the Urban Bantu Councils of
Soweto, Sharpevi1le, Sebokeng, Atteridgevi1le, NAFCOC, ASSECA and
various other organisations (53) . He attended conferences on Bantu
Affairs policy that were organised by industrialists and he
frequently appealed to the UP and even to Helen Suzman for advice on
particular issues (54) .
Janson had become a junior minister at a time when National Party
Bantu Affairs policy was under greater strain than ever before. The
urban African population had continued to grow over the previous ten
years and it was now clear that the bantustans were incapable of
fulfilling their grand apartheid mission. The national growth rate
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had dropped to its lowest level since Sharpevilie and organised
capital insisted that South Africa had expanded as far as it could
without removing racial restrictions on industrial production. The
international sports boycott and disinvestment campaigns had
gathered momentum, and inside the country private capital, the
Uni ted Party and bantustan leaders were c1 amour ing for reform.
Even erstwhile allies of the National Party like the NGK, IANA and
Afrikaner capital were making reformist noises. Janson's particular-
background made him receptive to the reform calls and his
receptivity was heightened by the events of his first few months as
deputy minister.
On January 9, 1973 2 000 workers at Coronation Brick and Tile
demanded a pay increase, triggering off the famous Durban strike
wave of 1973. From 1965-71 a total of less than 23 00O African
workers went on strike. In the first three months of 1973 60 ODD
African workers downed tools (56). The Durban strikes are
generally accepted as the starting point of both the independent
trade union movement and the reforms in labour legislation, but
their more general effect on National Party thinking has not been
explored (57). The Durban strikes were the first major sign of
African dissatisfaction since the crackdown on the ANC and PAC in
the early 1960s. Some Nationalists responded to the strikes in an
entirely predictable manner. Marais Vi1joen, Minister of Labour at
the time, told parliament that the strikes were all the work of
agitators from the University of Natal Wages Commission (53). But
other Nationalists took a more enlightened view of the situation.
JB Vorster, himself, told parliament that the strikes contained "a
lesson for us all."
They contain a lesson for hon. members on the opposite side;
they also contain a lesson for me and this side of the
House... I am looking past all party affiliations and past all
employers, and experience tells me this, that employers,
whoever they may be, should not only see in their workers a
unit producing for them so many hours of service a day; they
sou Id also see them as human beings with souls (59)
Janson took Vorster's sentiments a step further: "I agree with hon.
members when they say in a responsible manner that we should take
steps to take a firm grip of these strikes, not in the sense that
one should intervene by using force and violence, but in the sense
that one should seek solutions to the problems (60)."
Janson's quest for the solutions to these problems led him to the
conclusion that some reforms to grand apartheid were necessary. A
month after he made his statement on the strikes, he told par 1 lament
that urban Africans were a reality that would not disappear.
The way I view my task is that as far as these Bantu
concerned, as long as they are in the? White ar&&, for their
own bene?fit, also for the benefit of the Whites who need their
labour, we must accept that we have a task, namely that of
establishing and developing between those people and the
Whi tes the happiest relations possible; and any person who
says that 1i fe should be made unpleasant for Bantu in White
areas, is playing with the? future of both White South Africa
and non-White South Africa (61).
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Janson sought to modi -fy apartheid so as to make it more durable. He
did not contemplate abandoning any basic principles of white
domination. On the contrary, he argued at length that his
modi ficat ions of apartheid were necessary for the preservation ..of
whi te supremacy (62). Janson might have been a minister of
religion, but he was also a minister of the? National Party. Thus,
he did not propose to abolish apartheid, only to give it a human
face.
Giving apartheid a human face was, nevertheless, an arduous task.
Janson directed himself first to reforming its administration. He
repeatedly stressed to officials that they should be accessible to
the African public (63). In July 1973 he issued a press statement
ca11 ing for a *menslike bedel ing' for influx control. He declared
Die probleem is egter cm die tsotsi-element uit te hou. Wat
ons nodig het is 'n document wat onderskei tussen die
wetsgehoorsames en die leegleer-wetsverbreker (64).
Later in 1973, he announced that his department was streamlining the
registration process for black workseekers. The plan was to
eliminate long waits at pass offices that were the result of
bureaucratic inefficiency. He also called on township residents not
to tolerate offensive officials and corrupt policemen, but rather to
lodge complaints with the relevant authorities (65). By 1974 he had
identified a host of petty regulations and administrative practices
that had to be scrapped. These included the eviction of widows from
houses registered in the name of their late husbands and the expiry
of lodgers' certi ficates every three months (66). At the 1974
National Party Congress he told delegates that the time had come
"dat ons op plaaslike vlak moet begin om ons daarvoor te beywer dat
onnodige krapperige wetgewing van die wetboek verwyder word" (67).
Janson's reforms were not 1imi ted to administration. Having
realised that urban Africans were not going to disappear, Janson
took a number of measures to stab i1ise their condi tions of 1i fe.
His years as a dominee and as a town councillor had left him
sensitive to the importance of housing. At a meeting with the Vaal
Triangle Administration Board he declared: "Slegs waneer bantoes
gerieflik gehuisves is, sal hulle gelukkig wees en goeie diens lewer
en nie hunker nei ander trekpleisters nie. " (68) In par 1 lament he was
muc h more emp ha t i c:
There is a very great housing shortage and this is leading to
undesirable conditions. Anyone who denies this is denying a
truth. Therefore we must face the fact that something will
have to be done to relieve this housing shortage and the other
shortages which exist, such as the lack of recreational
facilities... It is true that there is a housing shortage and
it is true that there is a shortage of schools. This is not
in the interests of the Bantu, and for that reason it is not
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in the interests of South Africa either. Consequently we have
to do something about it, and a great deal more will have to
be done about it in the future... We cannot argue away these
-facts of a housing shortage and of an alarming increase of
crime." (69)
"through environmental causes people can become rapists,
robbers and murderers... We have to bend the economy to
provide housing for people so that they do not turn into
robbers, rap ists and murderers (70) .
Motivated by these beliefs, Janson placed a moratorium on all
removals of urban townships (71). He withdrew the restrictions
preventing township residents from extending their houses and he
announced that residents would be fully compensated for all
alterations that they made (72). He also engineered the
reintroduction of 3O year 'home-ownership' in May 1975. Although MC
Botha told parliament that the reintroduction of lhome-ownership'
was a product of talks between Vorster and the bantustan leaders
(73), Janson played the crucial role in this reform. Janson was
committed to home ownership as a way of stabilising the urban
African population. From his experience in Witbank municipal
politics he also believed that full property rights were necessary
if the financial base of township administration was to become
viable. The budget of whi te municipalities depended heavily on
assessment rates. Black local authori ties were deprived of this
source of revenue because they had no property to tax. Janson
maintained that unti1 this situation was rectified, black local
authorities would always be short of funds (74) . Moreover,. he
thought that denying urban Africans formal property rights served no
practical function. He later recalled his thinking at the time:
occupation to me meant ownership. Of course it's legally not
correct, but... the practical position was that they had
occupied the land and therefore, give them title to it. To me
it seemed the best thing (75).
Janson was not able to arrange the provision of full land and
housing property rights to township residents. With cautious
support from Vorster, however, he was able to pilot 30 year
home-ownership through the National Party (76)„ Once this had been
done, he made appeals to employers to provide housing for their
workers under the new dispensation (77). In addition, he met with
building societies to discuss how they could participate in the home
ownership scheme. The building societies lobbied his support for
the extension of the 30-year titles into freehold. When it became
clear that freehold rights would not be granted, they agreed to
provide 30-year home loans to individuals through the administration
boards (78).
Janson also addressed himself to the need for general development in
the urban townships. Soon after his appointment as deputy minister,
he announced the establishment of a joint BAD/private sector
township sports facilities fund. Rembrandt and Anglo American made
opening contributions of R50 000 and R200 000 respectively and the
•fund was able to raise enough capital to finance projects like the
Seorge Thabe Stadium in Sharpeville (79). In November 1973, he told
the Mid Free State Administration Board "CDit is 3 egter noodsaaklik
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vir die goeie verhoudinge tussen blank en nie-blank dat daar in
blanke gebiede geriewe vir Bantoes geskep word waar hulle 'n
menswaardige bestaan kan voer." The following month he told the
Midlands Administration Board to investigate with local chambers of
commerce the -feasibility of establ ishing large shopping centres in
the townships under their jurisdiction. By 1975 he was saying "The
time is overdue -for proper planning of townships which, in
accordance with what is provided in modern townships -for Whites,
could make provision for sports fields, swimming baths and other
recreational facilities (80).
Another of Janson's reformist interventions concerned the training
of urban Afr ican workers- Janson sat on the interdepartmental
committee on training whose formation Diederichs noted in his 1973
budget speech. Anglo-American and the FCI, with whom the committee
liased, mobilised his support. On the committee he argued for the
establishment of training centres in the 'white' areas that would be?
run by industry with as little interference as possible from the
state. This duly happened. On recommendation of the committee,
training centres were built and equipped by the Department of Bantu
Education, but the training that took place inside them was run by
industrialists (81).
As Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, Janson was given
responsibility for the establishment of the training centres. He
approached this task with enthusiasm. While many of his ministerial
col leagues reluctantly endorsed urban African training schemes as a
necessary response to the country's shortage of skilled labour,
Janson saw that they also dovetailed well with his own plans for
urban township development. This is clear from his response to
Helen Suzman s criticism of the increased service charges which
township development produced:
It was wrong in principle for the government to subsidise
basic services. The correct principle was that workers should
be paid a living wage and that, as costs rose, the wages
should take this into consideration. To me it is only logical
that employers should increase wages to compensate for
increased costs. It is then up to the employer to see to it
that productivety increases. I believe that Mrs Suzman *s plea
should be directed at employers rather than towards the
government (82).
Janson was prepared to. accept the removal of job reservation as a
logical, if electorally unpopular, consequence of the training
schemes. In deference to electoral politics he never explicitly
ca 11 t?d for the remova1 of job reservat i on. Never the1 ess, he
stressed that training African workers would be counter-productive
unless these workers could be guaranteed of ski 1 led jobs at the end
of their training: "You can have al1 the quali fications in the
world, but if you do not have the job opportunety that is when the
trouble will start" (83).
If providing Africans with work could prevent * trouble', so too
would talking to them. In October 1973 Janson announced his
intention to establish elected African counciIs to work with the
Administration Boards. He stressed "that it was important C that.3
Africans themselves should elect members to the proposed bodies. If
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they were selected by the department they could be accused of being
Government puppets, and this would destroy much of their potential
value" (84) . Janson's thoughts on these proposed counciIs
prefigured the Community CounciIs. In May 1975 he told par 1iament
that the government and homeland leaders had "agreed that
consideration be given to joining the existing Bantu urban counciIs
and the counciIs representing homeland Governments in the urban
areas into a new body wi th more powers and responsib i1i ties. " The
Star reported on his announcement as fol1ows:
It is re 1iably learnt that the increased powers and
responsibilities being considered could lift Black control of
their own urban affairs on to the level of that of a fully
fledged local authority (85).
VI
Janson's reforms created quite a stir in the early 1970s. Numerous
individuals and organisations who saw themselves opposed to the
Nationalists were outspoken in their support for him.• His first
speech in parliament was received enthusiastically by the United
Party, whose attitude to Janson thereafter was summed up by their MP
for Hi 1lbrow, GJ Jacobs:
We on this side of the House always 1 isten to the hon- Deputy
Minister with great interest becasue, he has a perceptivity o-f
mind that is denied many of his col leagues (86).
As early as May 1973, Helen Suzman conceded that Janson was
"bringing a new approach to bear on a difficult problem." Once he
had been Deputy Minister of Bantu Affairs for over a year she was
more generous wi th her praise:
I want to give C Mr Janson3 credit here and now, sir; he is the
one man to hold that job who has ever really expressed any
concern for the people over whom he has such vast jurisdiction
(87) .
Alex Boraine was another opposition par 1iamentarian who was
impressed by Janson (88).
Outside par 1iament, prominent capitalists enthused about Janson, as
did the English press (89). In the case of the latter, Janson was
at times embarrassed by the degree of support he received.
Addressing a National Party meeting in Pretoria he felt constrained
to point out that
I did not ask for that support (from the English press) but I
welcome it. But they must remember that I stand and fal 1 by
the Nationalist Party and its leader, Mr Vorster (90).
Janson's reaff irmation of his Nationalist credentials was necessary
because of poli tical tensions within the National Party. Janson was
aware that his reforms had made him unpopular in verkrampte circles
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secure the loyalty and support or even the co-operation o-f the
thousands o-f officials upon whom he depended. Some officials
responded positively to Janson's reformist posture. Prominent among
these were officials in the administration boards whose practical
e>:per ience had led them to the conclusion that apartheid
admin i strati on had to be modified (<?9) . But the overwhelming
majority of officials within the Department of Bantu Affairs itself,
saw no need to change and resented Janson's attempts to force them
to do so. They responded to his reforms in a way that would later-
become characteristic of Bantu Affairs officials: they obstructed
them bureaucratically. In doing so, they received the tacit and at
times overt support of M.C. Botha.
Janson's housing reforms were among those hardest hit by Botha's
interventions and by bureaucratic obstructionism. Botha simply
ignored Janson's announcement of an indefinite moratorium on urban
removals and continued to authorise the removal of townships that
were too close to white areas for his liking (100). Janson's plan
for differentiated township housing was almost regulated out of
existence by officials within the department (101). A similar fate
befell the reintroduction of 30 year leasehold housing. Officials'
obstructionism ensured that regulations governing leasehold only
appeared a year after the the return of home-ownership was announced
in parliament. Moreover, when these regulations finally appeared,
they stipulated that home-ownership would only be available to
township residents with homeland ci tisenship certificates (102).
Janson's sport policy also received rough treatment by verkrampte
bureaucrats. Janson felt that the department should use sport as a
way of improving the quality of 1 ife of urban township residents.
He saw his sports fund playing an important role here. However, the
sports officer of the Department of Bantu Affairs had other ideas:
Sport moet op 'n volksbasis geplaas word. Soos... uitgewys
moet elke volk sy eie sport he, bv. die Xhosa sokker, Tswana
tennis, Sotho golf ens. wat ui teindelik aan die tuisland
geknoop moet wees (103).
Even the training schemes, around which there appeared to be a
remarkable degree of consensus within the cabinet, were not immune
from bureaucratic obstructionism. When JC Knoetze of the Vaal
Triangle Administration Board pointed out that the schemes would be
useless if job reservation was maintained, the Bantu Education
official 1iasing with his board denied that this would be the case.
He explained his conception of the aims of the training: "Cdit isl
daarop ingestel otn aan die bantoes die basiese op leiding te gee,
sodat hy meer nywerheids-orienteerd is... Hy sal nou weet wat 'n
bytel is, wat 'n hamer is, ens. as hy gevra word cm dit aan te gee"
(104).
The verkrampte opposition to Janson also ensured that many of his
more grandiose schemes did not materialise at all during his spell
as Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education. The
influx control legislation was not amended to provide for a
"dokument wat onderskei tussen die wetsgehoorsames en die leegleer™
wetsverbreker". " Janson's ambition "to afford all the children of
the Bantu peoples free and compulsory education" (105) was not
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realised. He did not see township residents granted ful 1 property
r ights, nor did he preside over the introduction o-f Community
CounciIs.
Finally, in January 1976 his verkrampte opponents succeeded in
forcing him out of the department altogether. After refusing
several offers of ambassadorships, he was 'promoted' against his
will to become Deputy Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions, of
Planning and the Environment, and of Statistics. His deputy
ministerial portfolio within the Department of Bantu Administration
and Education was split into two new portfolios which were given to
the less than enlightened Messrs Andries Treurnicht and Ferdie
Hartzenberg <106).
VIII
In all, Janson spent three years and three months in the Department
of Bantu Administration and Education. After i/erkrampte opposi tion
and obstruction, the net effect of these three years on Bantu
affairs policy might appear negligible. The eulogistic approach to
Janson in the English Press seems a little out of proportion to what
he actually achieved. Nevertheless, we should be wary of dismissing
altogether the importance of Janson's three years. Some of Janson's
reformist measures actually did materialise. The reintroduction of
leasehold in the urban areas, however much it was restricted, was
significant. So too was the establishment of industrial training
centres for African workers in the urban areas. But if we are to
assess the real importance of Janson's term of office we need to
look beyond his direct achievements as Deputy Minister of Bantu
Administration and Education. We must look instead, to the indirect
effect that he had on urban township administration.
As I noted above, many senior officials in the administration boards
responded positively to Janson. This was unsurprising, because
these officials had to deal with the contradictions of grand
apartheid policy. All of the administration boards except West Rand
Administration Board and the Peninsula Administration Board acted
as development agents in designated homelands. The senior officials
of the boards, therefore had a clear sense of the state of homeland
development and of the incapacity of the homelands to fulfill their
grand apartheid mission. Moreover, the same officials had to face
the urban administrative problems created by a decade's neglect of
township development and a massive housing shortage. Many of them
agreed with Janson when he told par 1 lament that "serious situations,
sociological abuses and other abuses, may sirise i f these housing
shortages ^re not tackled with all the energy and enterprise at our
command" (107) . For them, Janson was someone with rank in the
Department of Bantu Administration who understood their predicament
and who offered them a way out of it. Janson recalled:
CFrom the administration boards I received 2 not only support,
but active support and enthusiasm... you were not preaching
heresy, you were only saying common sense things that they had
in their own hearts. I wouldn't say anything contradictory to
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their own -feel ings, their own ideas. It wasn ' t something that
would destroy the Afrikaner ideal or the National Party. It
was plain common sense tandJ it was accepted as such (108).
Thus, I wou 1 d argue that even i -f many of Janson ' s re-forms ran
aground on the bureaucratic ree-fs of- the department, unofficially,
they were adopted by some o-f the officials actual ly engaged in
day-to-day administration. A case study of the Vaal Tr iangle
Administration Board (VTAB) i1lustrates this point (109).
IX
The VTAB was established in 1973. Its chief d irector, JC Knoetse,
was a technocratic administrator who had never joined the National
Party. Knoetze's csireer in Vaal township administration started in
1950. He was the first Manager of the Vanderbijlpark Non-European
Affairs Department. When Sebokeng was established in 1965, he
became chief director of the Management Board o-f Sebokeng. He held
this post until he became chief director of the VTAB which took over
the functions of the board and of the municipal Non-European Affairs
Departments.
Knoetze's experience led him to share many of Janson's ideas about
Bantu Affairs policy. The township population of the Vaal is
overwhelmingly SeSotho speaking. Brand apartheid therefore envisaged
the relocation of the bulk of this population to Qwa-Qwa. But the
management board and the VTAB had acted as development agents in
Qwa-Qwa. So Knoetse knew that the bantustan had neither the
housing faci1ities nor the economic infrastructure to support the
population it contained already, qui te apart from any additions from
the Vaal. As early as August 1973 the VTAB decided that no
relocations from the Vaal to Qwa-Qwa could take place (110).
Once the VTAB reached this conclusion, it had to assume
responsibility for the Vaal housing shortage. For if residents on
the Vaal waiting list could not be housed in Qwa-Owa they would have
to be housed in the Vaal townships. The problem of the housing
shortage was given an added urgency by the presence of Evaton - a
freehold Arsa - adjacent to Sebokeng. Most of the people on the
wai ting 1 ist had set up shacks in Evaton which was becoming
increasingly di fficult to administer. An official complained:
Hierdie gesinne is gedurig aan die uitkyk vir beter
huisvesting met die gevolg dat hul le van plek tot plek in
Evaton rondswerf en kan daar due nooit behoorlik rekord van
hulle woonadresse gehou word nie. Op die wyse ontduik hulle
ook die betaling van hulle maandelikse permi tgelde en word
hulle daardeur blootgestel aan vervolging (111).
Janson's pronouncements on housing made sense to the VTAB. They
seemed to offer some solutions to the problems that the board
faced. Equally important, Janson's presence as deputy minister,
gave Knoetse the confidence to experiment with 'verligte' changes in
housing policy (112). Thus, from 1973 to 1976 the board began to
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transform i ts approach to housing. On Janson's insistence, it
accepted that the removals to Sebokeng of Boipatong, Bophelong and
Sharpevilie could not take place unti1 the housing backlog was
overcome (113). In January 1975, noting that the housing shortage
was restr icting the flow of labour, i t requested central government
loans to buiId 2000 houses per annum in Sebokeng (114). When it was
informed a year later that no more government loans were as/^i lable
for housing, it sought and found private financing. Over the next
two years, banks and building societies invested RIO mi 11 ion in Vaal
township housing (115). Employers matched this investment in
building homes for their workers. (116). In 1975, the board also
reached the conelusion that there "is a crying need for better types
of houses, e.g. better types of houses for doctors, chemists, etc".
In accordance with this it resolved to set aside 207. of all new
stands for the construction of 'better houses' (117). Three months
later it started a "Better Homes" scheme with Horld (the predecessor
of The Sowetan). The board encouraged residents to improve their
homes or to buiId new homes and PI or Id ran a weekly article on the
new/improved homes (1 IS). In addition, it addressed i tself to the
issue of township development. Knoetse noted that "As the backlog
in housing is being overtaken more attention is given the the
provision of social services, which sire essential for the
development of a civilised community" (119).
Janson's impact on the board was not limited to the field of
housing. The board took up his lead on industrial training centres
eagerly. Knoetze enthused about "the training of black labour,
which I regard as the only solution for the constant demand for
higher wages for blacks, and which is not only justified -from the
worker's point of view, but is also in the general interest of the
country" (120). He arranged the construction of a training centre
in the Vaal and he used the training issue to improve relations
between the VTAB and local manufacturing capital (121).
The board also responded to Janson's cal1 for a menslike bedel ing
for influx control. It began to discriminate between the
wetgehoorsames and the JeegJ^er-wetter brokers by providing housing
for workers who were legally employed in the Vaal Triangle and had
fami 1ies in the urban areas but no permanent residency rights
(122). The board adopted a more pragmatic approach to conflicts
between influx control and employers' needs. It granted companies
influx control exemptions for key workers (123) . It allowed
employers to transfer workers between urban areas (124) and i t
turned a blind eye to infringements of the Planning Act (125).
Knoetze'5 discourse on influx control changed completely. By 1977
he was tel 1 ing the departments "Di t is gemenesaak watter irritasie
Artikel 1O van die Bantoe (Stadsgebiede) Konsolidasiewet, 1945 (Wet
Hr 25 van 1945) tot gevolg het" (126)
The new approaches to housing and to influx control that the VTAB
developed during Janson's deputy ministership would be central to
their administrative policy throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.
Thus Janson's effect on Vaal township admin istration long outlived
his stay in the Bantu Affairs Department. The VTAB had the
reputation of being a particularly reformist administration board.
Nevertheless, Janson believes that other administration boards
responded to him in the same way as the VTAB d id. At this stage
there is no research either to confirm or to refute him. But, if he
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is correct, the movement towards reform in township administration
begins a long time be-fore the Riekert Commission and the statements
by PW Botha and Piet Koornhof wi th which this paper started.
Janson 's transfer out of the department was a setback for reform.
After his departure, Botha, Treurnicht and Hartzenberg tried to
return Bantu Affairs policy to its pre-Janson days. But their reign
was to be short1ived. The Soweto uprising, provoked in part by
Treurnicht's reactionary seal , marked the demise of the
verkramptes. First in the National Party and later in the
Department of Bantu Affairs, reformers gained control. By 1979 MC
Botha was out of politics, Piet Koornhof was Minister of Plural
Relations and Development (Bantu Affairs) and Janson was Minister of
Education and Training (Bantu Education). In the aftermath of
Soweto, the National Party made the decision that Janson had reached
earlier - that reform was the only way of avoiding conf1ict.
Paradoxically, however, the new reform programme contained a built-
in recipe for conflict. The state called for large scale township
development to overcome thirty years of neglect, but it was unable
to pay for any of this development. Thus, township residents had to
meet the full cost of infrastructural development that took place
during a period of rampant inflation in the building industry. In
1974, Janson had forseen this contradiction when he ca1 led for
employers to pay living wages to support township upgrading. The
reformist state in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, regarded
wages as the private domain of capital. Manufacturers, for their
part, wanted a stable workforce, but they did not want to pay for
its stabilisation. Thus wages did not keep pace with rocketing
township rent and service charges. The contradiction sharpened in
the early eighties as recession set in. By September 1984 it was
uncontainable.
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